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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the growth-effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 67 
developing countries covering from 1984 to 2016, with a special emphasis on the role of 
democracy. The empirical results obtained from generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimation demonstrate that democracy plays a crucial role in moderating the positive effect 
of FDI on output growth. The results are robust to several alternative measures of democracy 
and FDI. This suggests that the marginal effect of FDI on growth depends on the level of 
democracy such that countries which promote democratic institution benefit more from FDI 
inflows. The finding is consistent with the growing view that the growth-effect of FDI 
depends on other intervening factors in the host countries. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
The economic literature is filled with many studies which attempt to improve our understanding about why 
some countries are able to grow faster than the others. Several studies have highlighted that there are more than 
sixty variables that may help to explain the variations in growth performance across countries (see for example 
Durlauf et al., 2005 and Sala-i-Martin, 1997). According to the literature, foreign direct investment (FDI) by 
multinational corporations (MNCs) is regarded as one of the possible factors. Therefore, FDI is viewed as an 
important component for development and productive capacity building in many countries (especially 
developing countries). They view FDI as a channel for local firms to improve their productive capacity and 
efficiency because it allows them to learn and adopt from as well as imitate MNCs.  
The adoption of pro-FDI policies by many countries is based on the expectation that MNCs will bring 
tremendous benefits to the host countries, mainly in terms of new technology (De Mello, 1999). FDI is always 
linked to superior technologies as MNCs invest heavily in research and development (R&D) activities. 
Additionally, they recruit a large number of technical and professional workers and provide extensive trainings 
for their workers (Dunning, 1998). Once the local subsidiary has been set up, some of the positive externalities 
associated with MNCs will spill over to local firms because knowledge cannot be completely internalized. In 
addition, FDI is also viewed as a key mechanism for creating new employment opportunities, raising additional 
tax revenue, development of human capital, increasing trade and complementing domestic investment (Jenkins 
and Thomas, 2002).  
In order to tap the benefits associated with FDI inflows, many countries relax their foreign investment 
regulations. They introduce various types of incentives to encourage MNCs to invest in their countries. These 
include fiscal incentives (i.e. tax and tariff exemption and low corporate tax rates), financial incentives (i.e. loan 
and land subsidies) and others incentives (i.e. special economic zones, infrastructure subsidies, R&D subsidies 
and reducing bureaucracy). According to UNCTAD (2005, 2017), an average of 57 countries have changed 
their foreign investment policy (i.e. both liberalization and restrictive) over the past 25 years. Interestingly, the 
numbers of investment policy changes directed towards liberalization of investment policies far outweighed the 
number of restrictive policies. Specifically, an average of 112 regulatory changes were introduced annually with 
82% of the changes were made to facilitate foreign capital flows. These positive changes have provided strong 
incentives for MNCs to expand their operations globally. The data also reveals that the highest number of 
changes were made during 1996-2000 with 140 regulatory changes per year. Since then, the changes declined 
gradually but recent data for 2016 shows that the competition for foreign capital has intensified again as 124 
regulatory changes were recorded which exceeds the 25 years’ average (i.e. 112 regulatory changes). 
Although economic theories predict that FDI inflows will bring tremendous benefits to the recipient 
countries (Findlay, 1978; Wang, 1990), empirical findings reveal a conflicting relationship between FDI and 
output growth. While some studies have reported positive impact of FDI on growth (De Mello, 1999; Chong et 
al., 2008) others find that the impacts are negative (Aitken et al., 1997; Adams, 2009). Several recent studies 
have explored the reasons behind this mixed finding and absorptive capacity appears to be the key explanation.1 
Specifically, they find that the growth-effect is weak or non-existent in countries with poor absorptive capacity. 
In other words, FDI spillovers are not automatic consequences of MNCs presence but require the host countries 
to have certain quality which allow them to reap the maximum benefits from FDI inflows. In earlier literature, 
several factors have been recognized as important elements of absorptive capacity such as trade policy, level of 
economic development, human capital, financial market development, and economic freedom, among many 
others.  
In line with the recent literature which emphasizes on the role of institution in economic development, 
this study aims to examine the role of democratic institution in moderating the growth-effect FDI inflows. 
Specifically, we hypothesize that countries which promote democratic institution will benefit more from FDI 
inflows. At least, there are two reasons to support this argument. First, democracy is found to be robustly related  
 
1 Cohen and Levinthal (1990) deﬁne absorptive capacity as a ﬁrm's “ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and 
apply it to commercial ends.”  
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to the level of human capital (Baum and Lake, 2003) which is an important pre-condition for the positive impact 
of FDI (Borensztein et al., 1998). We can expect that human capital is widely available in democratic countries 
and hence more FDI spillovers are possible. Second, democracy may influence financial markets and systems 
which is also one of the important intervening factor for FDI spillovers (Alfaro et al., 2004; Azman-Saini et al., 
2010b). Democracy may limit the power of the state to control and repress financial system and therefore 
generate a more efficient banking system (Haber, 2007). Additionally, democratic countries tend to provide 
greater protections against expropriation which result in a better banking system and more developed stock 
markets (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Moreover, La Porta et al. (2002) suggest that democratic regimes tend 
to encourage financial development by discouraging government ownership of banks.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the related literature while 
Section 3 presents the methodology and data used in this paper. Section 4 reports the empirical results and their 
interpretations. The final section concludes and provides some policy recommendations.  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Several theories predict that FDI by MNCs is beneficial for the host countries mainly in the form of technology 
transfer to local firms. Findlay (1978) is perhaps one of the earliest theories which recognize the potential role 
of FDI in the development process. The author constructs a simple dynamic model which can accommodate the 
possible transfer of technology from various sources including FDI. Generally, FDI is viewed as a source of 
technical progress through technology spillovers from MNCs to local firms. Furthermore, Findlay (1978) 
suggests that the magnitude of FDI spillover is conditional on technology gap such that if the gap is too big 
local firms may not be able to benefit from MNCs presence. This idea was further supported by Wang (1990) 
who proposes a model in which knowledge applied to production is assumed to be a function of FDI. With 
increasing movement of capital, more technology is expected to be transferred across countries and the gap 
between developed and developing countries could be reduced.  
Earlier studies point out that FDI spilllovers are not automatic but depend on the absorptive capacity of 
the host countries. Several intervening factors have been highlighted in the literature which contribute to a 
nation’s absorptive capacity. For instance, Blomstrom et al. (1994) reveal that FDI spillovers depend on the 
level of economic development such that more developed countries benefit more from FDI inflows. Meanwhile, 
Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) examine the role of trade policy and find that the growth-effect is stronger in 
countries that pursue export promotion policies than in countries that pursue import substitutions. In fact, they 
uncover that FDI has no impact on growth in developing countries that follow import substitution policies. The 
authors argue that import substitution policies reduce the efficiency of FDIs by distorting the returns from social 
and private capitals. 
On another related issue, Borensztein et al. (1998) find that FDI inflows positively contribute to growth 
in countries with sufficiently high level of human capital. This finding is consistent with the view that FDI has 
high technological content and therefore requires labor that is able to understand and work with the new 
technology. However, the same effect could not be established for domestic investment. This finding implies 
that developed countries are able to benefit more from FDI inflows as they generally have higher level of human 
capital. This is further supported by Xu (2000) who unveils that technology transfer by U.S. MNCs contributes 
to the productivity growth in developed countries, but not in developing countries.  
In several recent studies, financial market has been highlighted as an important moderating factor in the 
FDI-growth link. Hermes and Lensink (2003) reveal that the development of the financial sector is more 
important than human capital for FDI spillovers. The importance of financial market has also been documented 
in Alfaro et al. (2004), Durham (2004) and Azman-Saini et al. (2010b), among many others. According to these 
authors, a more developed financial system positively contributes to the process of technology diffusion linked 
to FDI inflows as they are able to reduce the risks inherent in the investment made by domestic firms that seek 
to imitate technology developed by MNCs or to upgrade the qualifications of their workers. 
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Several other studies have examined the role of institution in moderating the impact of FDI on growth. 
A number of recent papers empirically confirm the importance of institutions for economic development.2 Apart 
from financial market, Durham (2004) also investigate whether countries with better institutional quality will 
benefit more from FDI and portfolio inflows. Using data on 80 countries they find that both FDI and portfolio 
investment have no direct effect on growth. However, the effects are contingent on institutional factors available 
in the host countries. Meanwhile, Azman-Saini et al. (2010a), Alguacil et al. (2011), Slesman et al. (2015) 
examine the specific type of institution namely, economic freedom. They argue that the lack of economic 
freedom can limit a firm's (or nation's) ability to absorb and internalize new technology from MNCs and 
contribute to host country's economic growth. They conclude that countries which promote freedom of 
economic activities benefit more from MNCs presence. Recently, Malikane and Chitambara (2017) find that 
FDI spillovers depend on political institutions (i.e. political stability and regime types) using a sample of eight 
Southern African countries.  
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Empirical model 
In order to test the role democratic institution plays in the FDI-growth relationship, this study relies on a model 
based on the works of Balasubramanyam et al. (1996); Alfaro et al. (2004) and Azman-Saini et al. (2010a). The 
baseline model can be specified as follows:  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
      
where y is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, FDI is foreign direct investment, DEM is democracy, X is 
a vector of control variables (such as trade openness, life expectancy, investment, population growth and 
inflation) that affect output growth. Additionally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is error term, 𝜂𝑖 term is unobserved country-specific effect, 
i and t are the usual country and time indexes, respectively.  
In order to test the hypothesis that democracy plays an important role in moderating the growth-effect of 
FDI, equation (1) is extended to include an interaction term constructed as a product of FDI and democracy (i.e. 
FDI x DEM). With this extension, the model can now be expressed as follows:  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 (𝐹𝐷𝐼 × 𝐷𝐸𝑀)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
     
In this framework, 𝛽3 is used to test the role of democracy in moderating the growth-effect of FDI. If the 
coefficient is found to be positive and significant, this would imply that the growth-effect of FDI is increasing 
monotonically with the level of democracy in the host countries.  In other words, democracy improves the 
growth-effect of FDI and countries with higher level of democracy benefit more from MNCs presence. Then, 
the marginal effect of FDI on output can be calculated by deriving the partial derivative of
ity , as follows: 
 
𝜕𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐸𝑀  (3) 
   
Following Brambor et al. (2006), the standard errors are calculated as follows: 
 
𝜎2 𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼
= 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝛽1) + 𝐷𝐸𝑀
2𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝛽3) + 2𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝛽1𝛽3)  (4) 
   
 
 
2 North (1990) defines institutions as the humanly devised constraints or rules of the game that structure political, economic, and social 
interaction. Important elements of these are formal rules (e.g., constitutions, laws, and property rights sustained through courts, and the 
police) and informal constraints (e.g., sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct). He further states that institutions provide 
the incentive structure of an economy. 
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Econometric methodology 
This study employs a generalized method of moments (GMM) panel estimator. The methodology was proposed 
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and then extended by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). The main reason for choosing this estimator is because of its ability in handling 
country-specific effects and simultaneity bias. Several authors have revealed that FDI is likely to be endogenous 
as higher output may attract more FDI that seek market expansion. This methodological procedure has been 
used in the analyses of finance-growth link (Levine et al., 2000; Beck et al., 2000), FDI-growth link (Azman-
Saini et al., 2010b; Alguacil et al., 2011), R&D spillovers (Chee-Lip et al., 2015), FDI-R&D link (Azman Saini 
et al., 2018; Tan and Azman-Saini, 2017) among many others. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose transforming Equation (2) into first-difference to remove country-
specific effects. Then, the lagged levels of the regressors are used as instruments to address endogeneity 
problem. This is valid under the assumptions that the error term is not serially correlated and the lag of the 
explanatory variables are weakly exogenous. This estimation strategy is known as difference GMM estimation. 
However, Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) and Blundell and Bond (1998) reveal that if the independent 
variables are persistent this type of modelling strategy may lead to incorrect inferences. In order to address the 
problem, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) have proposed a system GMM estimator 
which combines difference and level equations. In this strategy, additional moments are introduced for the level 
equation using the lagged difference of regressors as instruments.  
The validity of the GMM estimation depends on two specification tests. The Hansen (1982) J-test of 
over-identifying restrictions is used to evaluate the validity of the instruments. Under the null of joint validity 
of all instruments, the empirical moments have zero expectation, so the J statistic is distributed as a χ2 with 
degrees of freedom equal to the degree of overidentification. The second test examines the hypothesis that there 
is no (second-order) serial correlation in the error term (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Failure to reject the null of 
both tests would imply that the model is adequately specified and the result is valid.  
There are two variants of GMM estimators used in empirical literature namely, one- and two-step GMM 
estimators (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The one-step estimator uses weighting matrices that are independent of 
estimated parameters while the two-step GMM counterpart uses the optimal weighting matrices in which the 
moment conditions are weighted by a consistent estimate of their covariance matrix. This makes the two-step 
estimator more superior than the one-step estimator in term of asymptotic efficiency. Consequently, we use two-
step system GMM estimator in this study.  
 
Data and sample period               
This study estimates equations (1) and (2) by utilizing a sample of 67 developing countries over 1984-2016 
period3. The observations are averaged over five-year  non-overlapping period except for the last observation 
which is averaged over 3 years (i.e. 1984-1988, 1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2003, 2004-2008, 2009-2013, 
2014-2016) to smooth out the cyclical fluctuations in the series.  
This study employs several measures of democracy in order to enhance the credibility of regression 
results. The first measure of democracy is taken from Polity IV database. The variable is scaled between zero 
and ten such that the lower score implies low democracy and higher score represents higher level of democracy. 
The second measure uses variable published by the Political Risk Services (PRS) which publishes the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This indicator ranges from one to six in which lower values indicates 
lower democracy and vice versa4. The third indicator is taken from the Freedom House database on political 
right. The range of data is from one to seven, with higher score implies lower political rights and vice versa. 
Due to differences in interpretations across indicators, the last measure of democracy is transformed such that 
lower score implies lower democracy and vice versa. Finally, all indicators are rescaled such that the values lie 
between zero and twelve.  
 
3 The starting period is dictated by the availability of data from the ICRG. Appendix A provides the list of countries.  
4 This variable measures the degree to which its electorates are accountable by their governments and extent how much elections are fair 
and free. 
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The data on PPP adjusted GDP per capita and net FDI inflows as percentage of GDP is collected from 
the World Development Indicator database (WDI). Following the empirical growth literature, this study also 
includes other control variables such as trade as percentage of GDP (i.e. measure of trade openness), life 
expectancy (i.e. measure of human capital), gross fixed capital formation (i.e. proxy for investment in physical 
capital), population growth and inflation (measure of macroeconomic instability). These control variables are 
also collected from the WDI except for the life expectancy which is collected from the United Nations World 
Population Prospects database (UNWPP). For robustness check, we also use data on FDI stock which is 
collected from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database5. Table 1 
describes the data used in this analysis.  
 
Table 1 Data Description 
Variables Unit of Measurement   Source 
GDP PPP Adjusted GDP per capita WDI 
FDI Net FDI inflows over GDP WDI 
POP Annual % growth WDI 
TO Ratio over GDP WDI 
HC life expectancy (number of years)  UNWPP 
INV Ratio over GDP WDI 
INF Annual percentage   WDI 
DEMP Scaled from 0 to 10 Polity IV 
DEMI Scaled from 0 to 12 ICRG 
DEMF Scaled from 0 to 12 Freedom House 
FDIS Net inflows as a ratio over GDP UNCTAD 
Notes: GDP=GDP per capita, FDI=Foreign direct investment inflow, POP= Population growth, TO= Trade openness, HC= Human capital, 
INV= investment in physical capital, INF= Inflation, DEMP= Democracy measure polity2 from Polity IV, DEMI=Democracy measure 
from ICRG, DEMF= Democracy measure from Freedom House, FDIS=Foreign direct investment stock.  
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The first step of our analysis is to estimate the baseline equation (1) and results are presented in table 2. Model 
1, 2 and 3 present the results of using democracy measures from polity IV, ICRG and Freedom House, 
respectively. The findings reveal that the coefficients on FDI in all models are positive and statistically 
significant at the usual level which suggest that FDI is growth enhancing. For instance, the result for Model 1 
indicates that one percentage point increase in FDI enhances economic growth by 7.2 percentage points. Similar 
interpretation can be made for Model 2 and 3. These results are consistent with the findings in Awad and Ragab 
(2018) who also find  the positive impact FDI on economic growth. In addition, the results also reveal that as 
countries become more democratic, economic performance in term of output growth will improve as the 
coefficients on democracy are found to be positive and significant. The finding on the importance of democracy 
for growth is robust to various measures of democracy. Among all measures of democracy, Polity IV appears 
with the largest impact on growth. This finding is in line with Adams and Klobodu (2016) and Malikane and 
Chitambara (2017) who also find that democracy promotes economic growth.  
Moreover, investment in physical capital (INV) and inflation also affect growth positively. However, 
inflation rate has a minor impact on economic growth in the range of 0.0003 to 0.0004. Similarly, population 
growth reduces economic growth which is consistent with the theory. In addition, the negative finding on the 
impact of life expectancy on economic growth is consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) who find that 
improvements in life expectancy lead to some growth in aggregate incomes, but mainly trigger faster population 
growth, and therefore have a negative causal effect on income per capita. Finally, the finding reveals that trade 
openness is important for growth which suggest that countries will benefit more from trade liberalizations. More 
importantly, the specification tests suggest the results presented in the table are valid as all models are adequately 
specified because we fail to reject the null of both Sargan and AR(2) tests.   
 
5 Data on FDI stock on Suriname is not available.  
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Table 2 Results of Baseline Specification 
(N = 67 countries; T = 7; Sample Period = 1984– 2016) 
 Polity IV ICRG Freedom House 
Variables Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 
Lag GDP 0.278*** 0.272*** 0.279*** 
 (0.0214) (0.0217) (0.0245) 
FDI 0.063*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0081) 
DEM 0.83*** 0.167** 0.139* 
 (0.2123) (0.0666) (0.0809) 
HC -0.138*** -0.137*** -0.128*** 
 (0.0284) (0.0319) (0.0259) 
INV 0.03 0.034 0.027 
 (0.0275) (0.0275) (0.0287) 
POP -1.695*** -1.708*** -1.673*** 
 (0.2120) (0.2188) (0.2171) 
TO 0.042*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 (0.0058) (0.0053) (0.0048) 
INF 0.0003** 0.0004** 0.0004** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Constant 0.471 9.076*** 10.67*** 
 
Sargan test  
(3.0609) 
28.65 
(0.072) 
(2.1283) 
26.86 
(0.11) 
(2.0203) 
28.54 
(0.073) 
AR(1) -3.3888   
(0.001) 
-3.475   
(0.0005) 
-3.516   
(0.0004) 
AR(2) -0.916 
 (0.36) 
-0.306 
 (0.76) 
-0.317   
(0.751) 
Instruments 
Observations 
29 
469 
29 
469 
29 
469 
Notes: All models are estimated using xtdpdsys command. The standard errors are reported in parentheses, except for Sargan test, AR (1) 
and AR (2) which are p-values. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Time dummies 
are included in the model specification but the results are not reported to save space. 
 
The next step of our analysis is to test the main hypothesis that democracy level in the host countries 
will alter the way FDI affect growth. To this end, we rely on a linear interaction model as shown in Equation 
(2) and the results are presented in table 3. As revealed in the table, the interaction terms appear with positive 
signs and statistically significant in all models. This implies that democracy is critically important in enhancing 
the impact of FDI on growth. This finding is consistent with the findings in Malikane and Chitambara (2017) 
who also find that higher level of democracy and political stability allow recipient countries to benefit more 
from FDI inflows. Generally, this finding is consistent with the view that host countries must have certain 
quality which allow them to adopt and internalize new technology associated with FDI inflows. Moreover, all 
control variables generally appear with the expected signs and statistically significant in almost all models.  
Then, the marginal effects of FDI on growth is computed and Equation (4) is employed to calculate 
standard errors to test their statistical significance. All models demonstrate that the marginal effects are positive 
and statistically significant at the mean, minimum and maximum values of democracy. For example, in Model 
1A each additional percentage point of improvement in democracy will on average enhances the growth-effect 
of FDI by 8.7 percentage points. At the minimum and maximum points, the effects will increase by 6 and 9 
percentage points, respectively. Finally, it is worth noting that the fitted models are adequately specified as the 
null of both specification tests cannot be rejected. Therefore, the findings are valid.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
488 
 
 
 
International Journal of Economics and Management 
 
 
Table 3 Results of Interaction Specification 
(N = 67 countries; T = 7; Sample Period = 1984– 2016) 
 Polity IV ICRG Freedom House 
Variables Model 1A Model 2A Model 3A 
Lag GDP 0.268*** 0.249*** 0.272*** 
 (0.020) (0.0239) (0.0221) 
FDI -0.05*** -0.042*** 0.202*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0146) (0.0291) 
DEM 0.692*** 0.125* 0.195** 
 (0.2156) (0.0735) (0.0928) 
FDI x DEM  0.003* 0.006*** 0.023*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.006) 
HC -0.136*** -0.132*** -0.127*** 
 (0.0326) (0.0294) (0.0279) 
INV 0.052* 0.053* 0.034 
 (0.0302) (0.0301) (0.0272) 
POP -0.204*** -0.194*** -0.168*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0247) (0.0249) 
TO 0.044*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0057) (0.0055) 
INF -0.0002* 0.0001 0.0004** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Constant 2.252 9.356*** 10.68*** 
 
Sargan test  
(3.6144) 
30.23 
(0.05) 
(1.9026) 
29.49 
(0.06) 
(2.1253) 
27.51 
(0.093) 
AR(1) -2.6343   
(0.008) 
-2.894   
(0.004) 
-3.147   
(0.002) 
AR(2) -0.768   
(0.443) 
0.117   
(0.906) 
-0.222   
(0.824) 
Instruments 
Observations 
30 
469 
31 
469 
30 
469 
    
Marginal Effects 
Mean 0.087** 0.081*** 0.3597*** 
Minimum 0.0606** 0.0425*** 0.4805*** 
Maximum 0.0899*** 0.1103*** 0.2019*** 
Notes: All models are estimated using the Blundell and Bond (1998) dynamic panel system GMM estimations (Stata xtdpdsys command). 
The standard errors are reported in parentheses, except for Sargan test, AR (1) and AR (2) which are p-values. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Time dummies are included in the model specification but the results 
are not reported to save space. 
 
Two sensitivity checks are carried out to ensure that the finding documented earlier is robust. The first 
test uses FDI stock as an alternative measure of FDI in which the data on 66 countries are available. The 
empirical results of using FDI stock variable are presented in table 4. Interestingly, the result of interaction 
variables reveal that the coefficients are positive and statistically significant in all models. This suggests that 
the finding documented earlier are not by chance and the important role of democracy in moderating the 
growth-effect of FDI cannot be disputed. Similarly, all control variables appear with the correct signs and 
statistically significant in most cases. The marginal effects and their statistical significance are computed and 
presented at the bottom of the table. They are all positive and significant at the usual level. More importantly, 
both specification tests yield p-values of more than 0.05, indicating the validity of our results.  
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Table 4 Robustness checks using FDI stock 
(N = 66 countries; T = 7; Sample Period = 1984–2016) 
 Polity IV ICRG Freedom House 
Variables Model 1B Model 2B Model 3B 
Lag GDP 0.259*** 0.269*** 0.269*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0272) (0.0281) 
FDI -0.0159** -0.0087*** 0.012*** 
 (0.008) (0.0019) (0.0024) 
DEM 0.639*** 0.115* 0.163* 
 (0.2123) (0.0696) (0.0843) 
FDI x DEM 0.0014*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0005) 
HC -0.146*** -0.139*** -0.137*** 
 (0.0316) (0.0286) (0.0262) 
INV 0.066* 0.0802*** 0.0621** 
 (0.035) (0.0305) (0.0232) 
POP -0.172*** -0.155*** -0.1103*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0243) (0.0219) 
TO 0.0547*** 0.0312*** 0.0195*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0053) (0.005) 
INF -0.00001 0.0005*** 0.0006** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Constant 1.856 8.520*** 10.47*** 
 
Sargan test  
(3.3332) 
25.35 
(0.1491) 
(1.9544) 
27.12 
(0.1017) 
(1.7954) 
29.246 
(0.0622) 
AR(1) -2.6338  
(0.0084) 
-3.2363  
(0.0012) 
-3.6022   
(0.0003) 
AR(2) -1.2377   
(0.2158) 
0.0331   
(0.9736) 
-1.2576   
(0.2085) 
Instruments 
Observations 
30 
469 
30 
469 
31 
469 
    
Marginal effect 
Mean 0.0313*** 0.0168*** 0.02*** 
Minimum 0.0204*** 0.0087*** 0.0262*** 
Maximum 0.0325*** 0.0231*** 0.0119*** 
Notes: All models are estimated xtdpdsys command. The standard errors are reported in parentheses, except for Sargan test, AR (1) and 
AR (2) which are p-values. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Time dummies are 
included in the model specification but the results are not reported to save space. 
 
The second robustness check is implemented by using an alternative measure of democracy. 
Specifically, a new measure of democracy is constructed using principal component analysis. Table 5 present 
the result of estimating equation (2). Generally, the results reveal that the finding is similar to the one 
documented earlier. More importantly, the interaction term between FDI and democracy has the same positive 
sign and statistically significant at the conventional level. Therefore, we can safely conclude that the level of 
democracy in the host countries plays an important role in enhancing the impact of FDI on output growth. 
Countries which promote democratic institution are able to benefit more from FDI inflows and allow them to 
grow faster than the others.   
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Table 5 Robustness checks using Principal Component Measure of Democracy. 
(N = 67 countries; T = 7; Sample Period = 1984– 2016). 
 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
Variables Model 4 
Lag GDP 0.257*** 
 (0.0237) 
FDI 0.0306* 
 (0.0158) 
DEM 0.726** 
 (0.3098) 
FDI x DEM 0.0807*** 
 (0.0198) 
HC -0.142*** 
 (0.0314) 
INV 0.0346 
 (0.0241) 
POP -1.971*** 
 (0.2446) 
TO 0.0298*** 
 (0.0061) 
INF 0.0001 
 (0.0002) 
Constant 11.18*** 
 (2.1778) 
Sargan test  29.107 
(0.0643) 
AR(1) -2.7722   
(0.0056) 
AR(2) -0.941   
(0.3467) 
Instruments 
Observations 
31 
469 
  
Marginal Effects  
Mean -0.0306* 
Minimum -0.190*** 
Maximum 0.0762*** 
Notes: All models are estimated using xtdpdsys command. The standard errors are reported in parentheses, except for Sargan test, AR (1) 
and AR (2) which are p-values. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Time dummies 
are included in the model specification but the results are not reported to save space. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study investigates the role of democracy in moderating the growth-effect of FDI in developing countries. 
It employs a sample of 67 developing countries covering the 1984-2016 period. Methodologically, it uses a 
generalized method of moment panel estimator. The main finding reveals that the growth-effect of FDI depends 
on the level of democracy in the host countries. Specifically, the finding suggests that countries which promote 
democratic institution are able to benefit more from FDI spillovers, leading to better growth performance. More 
importantly, the finding is robust to different measures of democracy and FDI. In terms of policy implications, 
developing countries should improve the institutional reform policy agenda in order to benefit more from MNCs 
presence. Policymakers should weigh the cost of policies that focus on attracting FDI inflows versus those that 
seek to promote democratic institution. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Acemoglu, D & Johnson S 2005, ‘Unbundling institutions’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 5, no. 113, pp. 949-
994. 
 
491 
 
 
 
Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: The Role of Democracy 
 
 
Acemoglu, D & Johnson, S 2007, ‘Disease and development: the effect of life expectancy on economic 
growth’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 115, no. 6, pp. 925-985. 
Adams, S & Klobodu, EKM 2016, ‘Remittances, regime durability and economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA)’, Economic Analysis and Policy, vol. 50, pp. 1-8. 
Adams, S 2009, ‘Foreign direct investment, domestic investment, and economic growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’, Journal of Policy Modeling, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 939-949. 
Aitken, B, Hanson, GH & Harrison, AE 1997, ‘Spillovers, foreign investment, and export behavior’, Journal of 
International Economics, vol. 43, no. 1-2, pp. 103-132. 
Alfaro, L, Chanda, A, Kalemli-Ozcan, S & Sayek, S 2004, ‘FDI and economic growth: the role of local financial 
markets’, Journal of International Economics, vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 89-112. 
Alguacil, M, Cuadros, A & Orts, V 2011, ‘Inward FDI and growth: The role of macroeconomic and institutional 
environment’, Journal of Policy Modeling, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 481-496. 
Alonso-Borrego, C & Arellano, M 1999, ‘Symmetrically normalized instrumental-variable estimation using panel 
data’, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 36-49. 
Arellano, M & Bond, S 1991, ‘Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to 
employment equations’, The Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), 277- 297. 
Arellano, M., & Bover, O. (1995). ‘Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components 
models’, Journal of Econometrics, vol. 68, no. 1, pp. 29-51. 
Awad, A & Ragab, H 2018, ‘The economic growth and foreign direct investment nexus: Does democracy matter? 
Evidence from African countries’, Thunderbird International Business Review, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 565-575. 
Azman-Saini, WNW, Baharumshah, AZ & Law, SH 2010a, ‘Foreign direct investment, economic freedom and 
economic growth: International evidence’, Economic Modelling, vol. 27, no. 5, pp. 1079-1089. 
Azman-Saini, WNW, Farhan, M, Tee, C-L & Tun, YL 2018, ‘FDI inflows and R&D activity in developing countries’, 
International Journal of Economics and Management, vol. 12, no. S2, pp. 509-521. 
Azman-Saini, WNW, Law, SH & Ahmad, AH 2010b, ‘FDI and economic growth: New evidence on the role of 
financial markets’, Economics Letters, vol. 107, no. 2, pp. 211-213. 
Balasubramanyam, VN, Salisu, M & Sapsford, D 1996, ‘Foreign direct investment and growth in EP and IS 
countries’, The Economic Journal, vol. 106, no. 434, pp. 92-105. 
Baum, MA & Lake, DA 2003, ‘The political economy of growth: democracy and human capital’, American Journal 
of Political Science, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 333-347. 
Beck, T, Levine, R & Loayza, N 2000, ‘Finance and the sources of growth’, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 58, 
pp. 261-300. 
Blomström, M, Kokko, A & Zejan, M 1994, ‘Host country competition, labor skills, and technology transfer by 
multinationals’, Review of World Economics, vol. 130, no. 3, pp. 521-533. 
Blundell, R & Bond, S 1998, ‘Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models’, Journal of 
Econometrics, vol. 87, no. 1, pp. 115-143. 
Borensztein, E, De Gregorio, J & Lee, JW 1998, ‘How does foreign direct investment affect economic 
growth?’, Journal of International Economics, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 115-135. 
Chee-Lip, T, Azman-Saini, WNW, Ibrahim, S & Ismail, NW 2015, ‘R & D spillovers and the role of economic 
freedom’, International Journal of Economics and Management, vol. 9, no. S, pp. 41-60. 
Choong, CK, Baharumshah, AZ, Yusop, Z & Habibullah, MS 2010, ‘Private capital flows, stock market and economic 
growth in developed and developing countries: A comparative analysis’, Japan and the World Economy, vol. 
22, no. 2, pp. 107-117. 
Cohen, D, Levinthal, W 1990, ‘Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on learning and innovation’, Administrative 
Science Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 128–152. 
De Mello, LR 1999, ‘Foreign direct investment in developing countries and growth: a selected survey’, Journal of 
Development Studies, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 1–34. 
 
492 
 
 
 
International Journal of Economics and Management 
 
 
Dunning, JH 1998, ‘Location and the multinational enterprise: a neglected factor?’, Journal of International Business 
Studies, pp. 45-66. 
Durham, JB 2004, ‘Absorptive capacity and the effects of foreign direct investment and equity foreign portfolio 
investment on economic growth’, European Economic Review, vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 285-306. 
Durlauf, SN, Johnson, PA & Temple, JR 2005, ‘Growth econometrics’, Handbook of Economic Growth, vol. 1, pp. 
555-677. 
Findlay, R 1978, ‘Relative backwardness, direct foreign investment, and transfer of technology: a simple dynamic 
model’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 92, pp. 1–16. 
Haber S 2007, Political institutions and financial development: evidence from the political economy of bank 
regulation in Mexico and the United States, in S Haber, D North, B Weingast (Eds.), Political Institutions and 
Financial Development, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA. 
Hansen, L 1982, ‘Large sample properties of generalized method of moments estimators’, Econometrica, vol. 50, pp. 
1029–1054. 
Hermes, N & Lensink, R 2003, ‘Foreign direct investment, financial development and economic growth’, The Journal 
of Development Studies, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 142-163. 
Holtz-Eakin, D, Newey, W & Rosen, HS 1988, ‘Estimating vector autoregressions with panel data’, Econometrica: 
Journal of the Econometric Society, pp. 1371-1395. 
Jenkins, C & Thomas, L 2002, Foreign direct investment in Southern Africa: Determinants, characteristics and 
implications for economic growth and poverty alleviation. CSAE, University of Oxford. 
La Porta, R, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F & Shleifer, A 2002, ‘Government ownership of banks’, The Journal of Finance, vol. 
57, no. 1, pp. 265-301. 
Levine, R, Loayza, N & Beck, T 2000, ‘Financial intermediation and growth: causality and causes’, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, vol. 46, pp. 31- 77. 
Malikane, C & Chitambara, P 2017, ‘Foreign direct investment, democracy and economic growth in southern 
Africa’, African Development Review, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 92-102. 
North, DC 1990, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Sala-i-Martin, X 1997, ‘Transfers, social safety nets, and economic growth’, Staff Papers, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 81-102. 
Slesman, L, Baharumshah, AZ & Wohar, ME 2015, ‘Capital inflows and economic growth: Does the role of 
institutions matter?’, International Journal of Finance & Economics, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 253-275. 
Tan, B & Azman-Saini, WNW 2017, ‘Foreign direct investment and research & development activity: the role of 
competition’, International Journal of Economics and Management, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 467 – 482. 
UNCTAD 2005, International Centre for Trade, Sustainable Development, UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs, & 
Sustainable Development. Resource book on TRIPS and development. Cambridge University Press. 
UNCTAD 2017, Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual, 1970–2016. 
Wang, JY 1990, ‘Growth, technology transfer, and the long-run theory of international capital movements’, Journal 
of International Economics, vol. 29, no. 3-4, pp. 255-271. 
Xu, B 2000, ‘Multinational enterprises, technology diffusion, and host country productivity growth’, Journal of 
Development Economics, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 477-493. 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
 
This work was supported by Universiti Putra Malaysia Research Grant (#9651600) 
 
 
 
 
493 
 
 
 
Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: The Role of Democracy 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
APPENDIX A. LIST OF COUNTRIES AND KEY VARIABLES 
Country    GDP FDI DEM Country    GDP FDI DEM 
Albania 2149.5 5.46 7.00 Malaysia 5607.38 3.89 7.06 
Algeria 2997.0 0.72 4.01 Mali 459.91 1.70 6.66 
Angola 1816.1 5.25 3.47 Mexico 6453.76 2.23 7.43 
Armenia 1889.1 4.05 6.77 Mongolia 1724.28 4.38 8.26 
Bangladesh 548.8 0.56 6.06 Morocco 1878.29 1.53 1.91 
Bolivia 1451.4 3.31 9.11 Mozambique 339.90 9.46 5.80 
Botswana 4200.3 2.77 8.77 Namibia 3145.87 4.02 7.49 
Brazil 5762.2 2.31 8.80 Nicaragua 1208.89 4.69 8.19 
Bulgaria 3884.1 6.28 7.97 Niger 276.49 3.38 5.96 
Burkina Faso 394.2 0.93 3.94 Nigeria 1035.62 3.01 5.03 
Cameroon 1066.9 1.12 2.54 Pakistan 735.50 1.00 6.37 
China 2587.3 2.99 1.50 Papua New Guinea 1341.46 2.13 7.10 
Colombia 3535.8 2.93 8.71 Paraguay 2233.66 1.26 7.51 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 281.9 2.42 3.16 Peru 3068.47 3.01 8.27 
Costa Rica 5332.2 4.34 10.00 Philippines 1439.77 1.49 8.50 
Dominican Rep. 3368.1 2.92 8.60 Romania 4518.95 2.83 7.67 
Ecuador 3158.5 1.33 8.46 Russian Federation 6511.83 1.64 6.66 
Egypt 1634.7 2.39 2.53 Senegal 749.01 1.64 6.77 
El Salvador 2149.5 1.79 8.54 Sierra Leone 316.89 3.14 5.46 
Gabon 6131.8 1.85 3.54 South Africa 4388.65 1.01 8.90 
Gambia, The 511.3 3.49 4.20 Sri Lanka 1552.70 1.10 7.46 
Guatemala 2062.6 1.02 7.96 Sudan 963.20 2.14 2.90 
Guinea-Bissau 368.1 1.34 5.51 Suriname 4131.90 -5.27 6.73 
Guyana 1761.6 7.18 6.56 Tanzania 439.32 2.57 3.95 
Honduras 1302.3 3.90 8.23 Thailand 3139.57 2.41 7.20 
India 758.1 1.03 9.34 Togo 402.48 2.58 3.30 
Indonesia 1603.2 1.07 5.74 Tunisia 2697.26 2.38 4.04 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 3524.0 0.47 2.76 Turkey 6025.58 1.06 8.30 
Jamaica 3339.7 3.82 9.63 Uganda 378.95 2.58 3.46 
Jordan 2410.3 4.84 3.24 Venezuela 6873.35 1.41 7.84 
Kenya 657.1 0.77 5.71 Vietnam 809.52 4.90 1.50 
Liberia 268.4 30.79 5.73 Zambia 784.78 4.70 6.18 
Madagascar 317.8 3.04 6.84 Zimbabwe 704.55 1.17 3.87 
Malawi 258.6 2.60 5.80     
 
 
